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False Flag Operations

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Lyman Louis Lemnitzer (August 29, 1899 – November 12, 1988) was a United States Army general, who served as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from 1960 to 1962. He then served as Supreme Allied Commander of NATO from 1963 to 1969.

Early life and education[edit]

Lemnitzer was born on August 29, 1899 in Honesdale, Pennsylvania. He was raised Lutheran.[1] He graduated from West Point in 1920 and was assigned at his request to a Coast Artillery unit. Lemnitzer served in thePhilippines but soon began receiving the staff assignments that marked his military career.

Career[edit]

Lemnitzer was promoted to brigadier general in June 1942 and assigned to General Eisenhower's staff shortly thereafter. He helped form the plans for the invasions of North Africa and Sicily and was promoted to major general in November 1944. Lemnitzer was one of the senior officers sent to negotiate the Italian fascist surrender during the secret Operation Sunrise and the German surrender in 1945.
Following the end of World War II, Lemnitzer was assigned to the Strategic Survey Committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and was later named Deputy Commandant of the National War College. In 1950, at the age of 51, he took parachute training and was subsequently placed in command of the 11th Airborne Division. He was assigned to Korea in command of the 7th Infantry Division in November 1951 and was promoted to lieutenant general in August 1952.
Lemnitzer was promoted to the rank of general and named commander of U.S. Army forces in the Far East and of the Eighth Army in March 1955. He was named Chief of Staff of the Army in July 1957 and appointed Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in September 1960. As Chairman, Lemnitzer weathered the Bay of Pigs crisis and the early years of American involvement in Vietnam. He was also required to testify before theUnited States Senate Foreign Affairs Committee about his knowledge of the activities of Major General Edwin Walker, who had been dismissed from the Army over alleged attempts to promote his political beliefs in the military.
Lemnitzer approved the plans known as Operation Northwoods in 1962, a proposed plan to discredit the Castro regime and create support for military action against Cuba by staging false flag genuine acts of terrorismand developing "a Communist Cuban terror campaign in the Miami area, in other Florida cities and even in Washington". Lemnitzer presented the plans to Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara on March 13, 1962. It is unclear how McNamara reacted, but three days later President Kennedy told the general that there was no chance that America would take military action against Cuba. Within a few months, after the denial of Operation Northwoods, Lemnitzer was denied another term as JCS chairman.[2] Author Richard Cottrell suspects Lemnitzer of the key role in the Kennedy assassination, out of revenge for the demotion and for being soft on communism.[3]
In November 1962, Lemnitzer was appointed as commander of U.S. forces in Europe, and as Supreme Allied Commander of NATO in January 1963[4] until July 1969.[5] This period encompassed the Cyprus crisis of 1963–1964 and the withdrawal of NATO forces from France in 1966.

Later life and death[edit]

Lemnitzer retired from the military in July 1969. In 1975, President Ford appointed Lemnitzer to the Commission on CIA Activities within the United States (aka the Rockefeller Commission) to investigate whether theCentral Intelligence Agency had committed acts that violated American laws and allegations that E. Howard Hunt and Frank Sturgis (of Watergate fame) were involved in the assassination of President John F. Kennedy.

Death[edit]

Lemnitzer died on November 12, 1988 and is buried in Arlington National Cemetery. His wife, Katherine Tryon Lemnitzer (1901–1994), is buried with him.

In popular culture[edit]

Lemnitzer was played by John Seitz in the 1991 Oliver Stone film, JFK.

Awards and decorations[edit]

Lemnitzer was awarded numerous military awards and decorations[6] including but not limited to:
US Army Airborne basic parachutist badge.gif Parachutist Badge
Bronze oak leaf cluster
Bronze oak leaf cluster
Bronze oak leaf cluster
Army Distinguished Service Medal with three oak leaf clusters
Navy Distinguished Service Medal
Air Force Distinguished Service Medal
Silver Star
Legion of Merit degree of Officer - awarded by mistake but not rescinded by FDR during World War II
Legion of Merit degree of Legionnaire
Presidential Medal of Freedom (Awarded by President Reagan, June 23, 1987)
American Defense Service Medal
American Campaign Medal
Bronze star
Bronze star
European-African-Middle Eastern Campaign Medal (with two campaign stars)
World War II Victory Medal
Army of Occupation Medal
National Defense Service Medal
Bronze star
Bronze star
Korean Service Medal (with two service stars)
Foreign decorations
Honorary Companion of the Most Honourable Order of the Bath (Great Britain)
Honorary Commander of the Most Excellent Order of the British Empire (Great Britain)
Knight of the Grand Cross of the Order of Merit of the Italian Republic (Italy)
Grand Cross of the Order of the Crown of Italy (Italy)
Grand Cross of the Military Order of Italy (Italy)
Grand Cross of the Légion d'Honneur (France)
Dutch Knight Grand Cross in the Order of Orange-Nassau, with Swords (Netherlands)
Médaille militaire (France)
Croix de Guerre with Palm (France)
Bundeswehr Cross of Honour in Gold (Germany)
Grand Officer of the Order of Boyaca (Colombia)
Grand Cordon First Class of the Order of the Rising Sun (Japan)
Medalha de Guerra (Brazil)
Grand Official of the Order of Military Merit (Brazil)
Order of Military Merit Teaguk (Korea)
Gold star
Order of Military Merit Teaguk with Gold Star (Korea)
Gold Cross of Merit with Swords (Poland)
Knight Grand Cross of the Most Exalted Order of the White Elephant (Thailand)
Medal for Military Merit, First Class (Czechoslovakia)
Royal Order of the White Eagle, Class II (Yugoslavia)
Grand Star of Military Merit (Chile)
Order of Menelik II (Ethiopia)
United Nations Korea Medal
Republic of Korea Presidential Unit Citation

See also[edit]






Operation Northwoods

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Operation Northwoods memorandum (13 March 1962)[1]
Operation Northwoods was a series of proposals that originated within the Department of Defense (DoD) and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) of the United States government in 1962. The proposals, which called for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), or other operatives, to commit acts of terrorism in US cities and elsewhere, were rejected by the Kennedy administration.[2]
At the time of the proposal, Cuba had recently become communist under Fidel Castro. The operation proposed creating public support for a war against Cuba by blaming it for terrorist acts.[3] To this end, Operation Northwoods proposals recommended hijackings and bombings followed by the introduction of phony evidence that would implicate the Cuban government. It stated:
The desired resultant from the execution of this plan would be to place the United States in the apparent position of suffering defensible grievances from a rash and irresponsible government of Cuba and to develop an international image of a Cuban threat to peace in the Western Hemisphere.
Several other proposals were included within Operation Northwoods, including real or simulated actions against various US military and civilian targets. The operation recommended developing a "Communist Cuban terror campaign in the Miami area, in other Florida cities and even in Washington".
The plan was drafted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, signed by Chairman Lyman Lemnitzer and sent to the Secretary of Defense. Although part of the US government's anti-communist Cuban Project, Operation Northwoods was never officially accepted; it was authorized by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but then rejected by President John F. Kennedy. According to currently released documentation, none of the operations became active under the auspices of the Operation Northwoods proposals.

Origins and public release[edit]

The main proposal was presented in a document titled "Justification for U.S. Military Intervention in Cuba (TS)," a top secret collection of draft memoranda written by the Department of Defense (DoD) and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS).[1] The document was presented by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara on 13 March 1962 as a preliminary submission for planning purposes. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that both the covert and overt aspects of any such operation be assigned to them.
The previously secret document was originally made public on 18 November 1997, by the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Review Board,[4] a U.S. federal agency overseeing the release of government records related to John F. Kennedy's assassination.[5][6] A total of 1,521 pages of once-secret military records covering 1962 to 1964 were concomitantly declassified by said Review Board.
"Appendix to Enclosure A" and "Annex to Appendix to Enclosure A" of the Northwoods document were first published online by the National Security Archive on 6 November 1998 in a joint venture with CNN as part of its 1998 Cold War television documentary series[7][8]—specifically, as a documentation supplement to "Episode 10: Cuba," which aired on 29 November 1998.[9] "Annex to Appendix to Enclosure A" is the section of the document which contains the proposals to stage terrorist attacks.
The Northwoods document was published online in a more complete form, including cover memoranda, by the National Security Archive on 30 April 2001.[10]

Content[edit]

In response to a request for pretexts for military intervention by the Chief of Operations of the Cuba Project, Brig. Gen. Edward Lansdale, the document listed methods, and outlined plans, that the authors believed would garner public and international support for U.S. military intervention in Cuba. According to Jacob Hornberger:
The plan called for U.S. personnel to disguise themselves as agents of the Cuban government and to engage in terrorist attacks on the U.S. base at Guantanamo Bay. It also called for terrorist attacks within the United States that would be conducted by pro-U.S. forces disguising themselves as Cuban agents.
According to the documents, the plan called for the following:
  1. Since it would seem desirable to use legitimate provocation as the basis for U.S. military intervention in Cuba a cover and deception plan, to include requisite preliminary actions such as has been developed in response to Task 33 c, could be executed as an initial effort to provoke Cuban reactions. Harassment plus deceptive actions to convince the Cubans of imminent invasion would be emphasized. Our military posture throughout execution of the plan will allow a rapid change from exercise to intervention if Cuban response justifies.
  2. A series of well coordinated incidents will be planned to take place in and around Guantanamo to give genuine appearance of being done by hostile Cuban forces. [11]
  3. United States would respond by executing offensive operations to secure water and power supplies, destroying artillery and mortar emplacements which threaten the base.
  4. Commence large scale United States military operations.

Related Operation Mongoose proposals[edit]

Main article: Operation Mongoose
In addition to Operation Northwoods, under the Operation Mongoose program the U.S. Department of Defense had a number of similar proposals to be taken against the Cuban regime of Fidel Castro.
Twelve of these proposals come from a 2 February 1962 memorandum entitled "Possible Actions to Provoke, Harass or Disrupt Cuba," written by Brig. Gen. William H. Craig and submitted to Brig. Gen. Edward Lansdale, the commander of the Operation Mongoose project.[12][6]
The memorandum outlines Operation Bingo, a plan to; "create an incident which has the appearance of an attack on U.S. facilities (GMO) in Cuba, thus providing an excuse for use of U.S. military might to overthrow the current government of Cuba."
It also includes Operation Dirty Trick, a plot to blame Castro if the 1962 Mercury manned space flight carrying John Glenn crashed, saying: "The objective is to provide irrevocable proof that, should the MERCURY manned orbit flight fail, the fault lies with the Communists et al. Cuba [sic]." It continues, "This to be accomplished by manufacturing various pieces of evidence which would prove electronic interference on the part of the Cubans."
Even after General Lemnitzer lost his job as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Chiefs of Staff still planned false-flag pretext operations at least into 1963. A different U.S. Department of Defense policy paper created in 1963 discussed a plan to make it appear that Cuba had attacked a member of the Organization of American States (OAS) so that the United States could retaliate. The U.S. Department of Defense document says of one of the scenarios, "A contrived 'Cuban' attack on an OAS member could be set up, and the attacked state could be urged to take measures of self-defense and request assistance from the U.S. and OAS."
The plan expressed confidence that by this action, "the U.S. could almost certainly obtain the necessary two-thirds support among OAS members for collective action against Cuba."[13][14]
Included in the nations the Joint Chiefs suggested as targets for covert attacks were Jamaica and Trinidad-Tobago. Since both were members of the British Commonwealth, the Joint Chiefs hoped that by secretly attacking them and then falsely blaming Cuba, the United States could incite the people of the United Kingdom into supporting a war against Castro.[13] As the U.S. Department of Defense report noted:
Any of the contrived situations described above are inherently, extremely risky in our democratic system in which security can be maintained, after the fact, with very great difficulty. If the decision should be made to set up a contrived situation it should be one in which participation by U.S. personnel is limited only to the most highly trusted covert personnel. This suggests the infeasibility of the use of military units for any aspect of the contrived situation."[13]
The U.S. Department of Defense report even suggested covertly paying a person in the Castro government to attack the United States: "The only area remaining for consideration then would be to bribe one of Castro's subordinate commanders to initiate an attack on [theU.S. Navy base at] Guantanamo."[13]

Reaction[edit]

The continuing push against the Cuban government by internal elements of the U.S. military and intelligence communities (the failed Bay of Pigs Invasion, the Cuban Project, etc.) had already prompted President John F. Kennedy to attempt to rein in burgeoning hardline anti-Communist sentiment that was intent on proactive, aggressive action against communist movements around the globe. After the Bay of Pigs, Kennedy had fired CIA director Allen W. Dulles, Deputy Director Charles P. Cabell, and Deputy Director Richard Bissell, and turned his attention towards Vietnam. Kennedy had also stripped the CIA of responsibility for paramilitary operations like the Bay of Pigs and turned them over to the U.S. Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which, as Commander in Chief, Kennedy could more directly control. Personally, Kennedy's attempt to curtail the CIA's extensive Cold War and paramilitary operations was a direct expression of this concern.
Kennedy personally rejected the Northwoods proposal, and it would now be the Joint Chiefs' turn to incur his displeasure. A JCS/Pentagon document (Ed Lansdale memo) dated 16 March 1962 titled MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT, 16 MARCH 1962 reads: "General Lemnitzer commented that the military had contingency plans for U.S. intervention. Also it had plans for creating plausible pretexts to use force, with the pretext either attacks on U.S. aircraft or a Cuban action in Latin America for which we could retaliate. The President said bluntly that we were not discussing the use of military force, that General Lemnitzer might find the U.S so engaged in Berlin or elsewhere that he couldn't use the contemplated 4 divisions in Cuba."[15] The proposal was sent for approval to the Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara, but was not implemented.
(Some fifty years later when asked about the plot, Robert McNamara drew a blank. "I have absolutely zero recollection of it. But I sure as hell would have rejected it," McNamara said, adding, "I really can't believe that anyone was proposing such provocative acts in Miami. How stupid!"[16])
Following presentation of the Northwoods plan, Kennedy removed Lemnitzer as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, although he became Supreme Allied Commander of NATO in January 1963. American armed forces leaders began to perceive Kennedy as going soft on Cuba, and the President became increasingly unpopular with the military, a rift that came to a head during Kennedy's disagreements with the service chiefs over the Cuban Missile Crisis.
On 3 August 2001, the National Assembly of People's Power of Cuba (the main legislative body of the Republic of Cuba) issued a statement referring to Operation Northwoods and Operation Mongoose wherein it condemned such U.S. government plans.[17]

See also[edit]

References[edit]

  1. Jump up to:a b U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Justification for US Military Intervention in Cuba (TS)"U.S. Department of Defense, 13 March 1962. The Operation Northwoods document in PDF format on the website of the independent, non-governmental research institute the National Security Archive at the George Washington University Gelman Library, Washington, D.C. Direct PDF links: here and here.
  2. Jump up^ Ruppe, David (May 1, 2001). "U.S. Military Wanted to Provoke War With Cuba". ABC News. Retrieved January 21, 2012.
  3. Jump up^ Zaitchik, Alexander (3 March 2011) Meet Alex JonesRolling Stone
  4. Jump up^ "The Records of the Assassination Records Review Board," National Archives and Records Administration.
  5. Jump up^ "Media Advisory: National Archives Releases Additional Materials Reviewed by the Assassination Records Review Board,"Assassination Records Review Board (a division of the U.S. National Archives and Records Administration), 17 November 1997. A U.S. government press-release announcing the declassification of some 1,500 pages of U.S. government documents from 1962 to 1964 relating to U.S. policy towards Cuba, among which declassified documents included the Operation Northwoods document.
  6. Jump up to:a b Tim Weiner, "Documents Show Pentagon's Anti-Castro Plots During Kennedy Years," New York Times, 19 November 1997; appeared on the same date and by the same author in the New York Times itself as "Declassified Papers Show Anti-Castro Ideas Proposed to Kennedy," late edition—final, section A, pg. 25, column 1.
  7. Jump up^ "National Security Archive: COLD WAR: Documents," National Security Archive, 27 September 1998 – 24 January 1999.
  8. Jump up^ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Appendix to Enclosure A: Memorandum for Chief of Operations, Cuba Project" and "Annex to Appendix to Enclosure A: Pretexts to Justify U.S. Military Intervention in Cuba," U.S. Department of Defense, c. March 1962. First published online by the National Security Archive on 6 November 1998, as part of CNN's Cold War documentary series. "Annex to Appendix to Enclosure A" is the section of the Operation Northwoods document which contains the proposals to stage terrorist attacks.
  9. Jump up^ "Cold War Teacher Materials: Episodes," and "Educator Guide to CNN's COLD WAR Episode 10: Cuba," Turner Learning (Turner Broadcasting System, Inc.).
  10. Jump up^ "Pentagon Proposed Pretexts for Cuba Invasion in 1962," National Security Archive, 30 April 2001.
  11. Jump up^ Annex to Appendix to Enclosure A: Pretexts to Justify U.S. Military Intervention in Cuba, media.nara.gov, accessed 3 September 2009
  12. Jump up^ Mike Feinsilber, "At a tense time, plots abounded to humiliate Castro," Associated Press (AP), 18 November 1997; also availablehere.
  13. Jump up to:a b c d James Bamford, Chapter 4: "Fists" of Body of Secrets: Anatomy of the Ultra-Secret National Security Agency From the Cold War Through the Dawn of a New Century (New York: Doubleday, first edition, 24 April 2001), ISBN 0-385-49907-8.
  14. Jump up^ Mike Feinsilber, "Records Show Plan To Provoke Castro," Associated Press (AP), 29 January 1998.
  15. Jump up^ Lansdale Memo of 16 Mar 1962. This memo records a high-level meeting in the White House 3 days after McNamara was presented with Operation Northwoods. [1]
  16. Jump up^ Brothers by David Talbot.
  17. Jump up^ "Statement by the National Assembly of People's Power of the Republic of Cuba," National Assembly of People's Power of Cuba, 3 August 2001; also available here.

Further reading[edit]

  • Jon Elliston, editor, Psywar on Cuba: The Declassified History of U.S. Anti-Castro Propaganda (Melbourne, Australia and New York: Ocean Press, 1999), ISBN 1-876175-09-5.
  • James Bamford, Body of Secrets: Anatomy of the Ultra-Secret National Security Agency From the Cold War Through the Dawn of a New Century (New York: Doubleday, first edition, 24 April 2001), ISBN 0-385-49907-8. Here is an excerpt from Chapter 4: "Fists" of this book.

External links[edit]

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